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Abstract 
Given the ubiquity of digital technologies, and increased use of autonomous algorithms, it is likely 
that many of today’s social and organisational processes will one day include autonomous 
elements. The Bitcoin blockchain is likely the first case of an increasingly generative and 
autonomous way of organising—and one in which the blockchain itself, as a digital infrastructure, 
plays a crucial role in how, and which, organising objectives are realised. The specific properties 
of blockchain infrastructures—distribution of control, openness to manipulation, and generativity 
of the underlying source code—make it an ideal case to study patterns of what we call ‘self-
organising’.  
This paper investigates the phenomenon of self-organising through a study of forking in the 
Bitcoin blockchain infrastructure between 2010 and 2016. It adds to the emerging body of 
research on digital infrastructures, and particularly blockchain infrastructures, by conceptualising 
forking as a pattern of self-organising in blockchain infrastructures, specifically involving: 1) the 
underlying infrastructure; 2) the scale of code changes; 3) individual objectives; and 4) collective 
adoption, whether specific or general. Thus, it shows how forking in blockchain infrastructures 
mediates between divergent organising objectives and existing capabilities, on the one hand, and 
generates self-organising on the other hand. It further contextualises these findings in extant work 
on digital infrastructures, offers a guide for designers of blockchain infrastructures and proposes 
the concept of ‘generative mirroring’ as a pattern wherein blockchain infrastructures and 
organising adaptively co-evolve. 
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Introduction 
One of the most anticipated applications of blockchain technologies (hereafter just ‘the 
blockchain’) is that of the autonomous, self-governing and self-regulating infrastructure, for 
instance through a Distributed Autonomous Organisation (DAO) (“The Bitcoin Hype And The 
Potential Disruptive Power Of Blockchain Technology” 2018; Beck et al. 2016; Chapron 2017; 
Peters and Panayi 2015; Wörner et al. 2016). Once fully realised, these DAOs, the archetypical 
instance of distributed organising, are expected to be fluid and digital in nature—without offices, 
managers, contracts, policies or payrolls, and without centralised strategic agendas (Barrett et al. 
2016). Instead it is believed that reliable time stamps and automated, verifiable decision 
processes will allow not just for fully automated organising processes at scale, but for more 
reliable organising as transparent digital processes replace ad hoc social ones (e.g. Markus and 
Robey 1983).  
However, we are a long way from understanding what it takes to facilitate the creation of a robust 
and transparent DAO: the interplay between the autonomous and distributed capabilities of a 
digital infrastructure like the blockchain, and the social objectives that can be realised through it, 
are still poorly understood. Moreover, early DAOs and first generation blockchain infrastructures 
have been crippled by tensions between the capabilities of the blockchain and the objectives of 
individuals and communities (e.g. Andersen and Ingram Bogusz 2017; Avital et al. 2016). For 
instance, an Ethereum-based DAO was brought down in May 2016 (see Leising 2017) due to 
flaws in the protocol that governed the DAO—which allowed for the theft of tokens worth around 
150 million USD at the time. This was partly because the code itself had a loophole that an 
individual could exploit, and partly because the dynamics around such exploitation are poorly 
understood. The theft represents the first of many instances of self-organising, where the 
capabilities of a blockchain infrastructure and heterogeneous objectives intersect and lead to new 
patterns of organising and to the pursuit of new objectives.1 Our understanding of this notion of 
self-organising and the dynamics that drive it are still under development: blockchain governance, 
decision rights, accountability, and incentives have all been highlighted as sources of potential 
friction (Beck et al. 2018), but have never to our knowledge been explored in the context of 
organising. This lack of understanding around the interplay between technology capabilities and 
organising in the blockchain context may contribute to the observation that radical organisational 
transformations may take more time than expected (Iansiti and Lakhani 2017) as well as to the 
failure of some early instances of self-organising mediated by the blockchain. 
In this paper, we zoom in on organising at the intersection of digital blockchain infrastructures and 
distributed social objectives, or what we call ‘self-organising’. Here, we define self-organising as 
involving changes in structures, processes and boundaries between independent actors guided 
by recursively applied, code-enshrined rules (Drazin and Sandelands 1992; Holland 1992; 
Pettigrew et al. 2001). We further take into account the role of digital artefacts, in this case the 
blockchain as a digital infrastructure, in these processes (Leonardi and Barley 2008). We build on 
the observation that the fulfilment of organising objectives through the blockchain entails 
distributed organising, leading to unclear chains of cause and effect (Beck et al. 2018). Indeed, 
the dynamics between a distributed blockchain infrastructure and distributed objectives, and how 
they lead to the fulfilment of diverse objectives—more broadly thought of as organising—remain 
to be explored.  
Extant research has shown that the most efficient pursuit of organising objectives can be 
facilitated by organising that ‘mirrors’ the underlying digital artefact(s) upon which it depends 
                                                             
1 Although the DAO case is an interesting illustration, as an isolated incident it lacks the detail and dynamism needed 
for a deeper study of self-organising. 
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(Burton and Galvin 2018; Tiwana et al. 2010). While the objectives themselves are believed to 
evolve in response to exogenous environmental changes (Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013), 
artefacts are treated as controlled by the organisation itself, with little influence over the resulting 
organisational objectives. Instead, hierarchical organisations have clear hierarchies and loci of 
control: aligning digital capabilities and organising objectives through mirroring is therefore a 
question of top-down strategy and design rather than co-ordination (Lee and Berente 2012). 
However, a digital infrastructure, defined as a “shared, unbounded, heterogeneous, open, and 
evolving sociotechnical system comprising an installed base of diverse information technology 
capabilities and their user, operations, and design communities” (Tilson et al. 2010: 748), has no 
clear hierarchy or locus of control. Instead, digital infrastructures are characterised by distributed 
control, fluid technological capabilities, and openness to manipulation by a large and 
heterogeneous community. Top-down governance is therefore not only unpopular, it is often 
impossible (O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007). If there is going to be alignment between capabilities 
and the pursuit of objectives—and there is no guarantee that there will be—this will need to be 
emergent and cannot be controlled in the same way as in a hierarchical organisation. Thus, the 
possibility of pursuing certain objectives, and thus organising more generally, likely cannot be 
controlled ex ante. 
Three characteristics specific to blockchain infrastructures affect whether—and how—diverging 
organising objectives can be realised: 1) distributed control of decision rights through transaction 
verification (Beck et al. 2018); 2) openness to manipulation of infrastructure capabilities 
(Campbell-Verduyn 2018); and 3) generativity of organising objectives (Andersen and Ingram 
Bogusz 2017; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013). First, algorithms called consensus mechanisms 
set the recursively-applied rules that govern which node verifies transactions in the distributed 
ledger (Bano et al. 2017; Chiravuri et al. 2011). As a result, the addition of new transactions to 
the ledger is controlled by a network of distributed verifier nodes. Second, the source code 
dictates how the infrastructure operates, including the rules whereby platforms, applications and 
other modules connect to it (Nyman and Lindman 2013). For most public blockchain 
infrastructures, this code is open to manipulation by an Open Source (OS) community (Howison 
and Crowston 2014), meaning that some of what we know about OS communities may be relevant 
to understanding the blockchain. Lastly, although code and algorithms play a key role, so too do 
the shared objectives of the members of its distributed community of users, developers, and 
miners (Beck et al. 2016).  
We observe that these three characteristics of blockchain infrastructures, and with them 
technological and social processes, are not severable: organising does not originate from either 
the technological capabilities or the individuals involved. Instead, it emerges as ‘self-organising’ 
interactions between independent actors in a distributed system, governed by recursively applied 
(code-based) rules that generate stable social structures (Drazin and Sandelands 1992; Holland 
1992). Thus, self-organising entails patterns and regularity emerging without central control, 
whether individual, organisational or digital (Anderson 2012). 
Research into the relationship between organising objectives and the evolution of blockchain 
infrastructures falls short when it comes to understanding self-organising in the face of the 
complex interdependencies described above. In this paper, we therefore ask the following 
question:  
 How does self-organising occur in blockchain infrastructures?  
We address this research question through a multi-method, longitudinal case study of self-
organising in the Bitcoin blockchain infrastructure over the course of six years. The Bitcoin 
blockchain, while a digital infrastructure, does not have an organisational legacy (see, e.g., Star 
and Ruhleder 1996). Instead, the infrastructure was created in isolation: by an anonymous 
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individual or group of individuals who later severed ties with the project. As such, Bitcoin does not 
have an ex ante organising base (hierarchical or otherwise), as it was severed from whatever 
organising base it once had. Instead, self-organising emerged from and around the infrastructure 
as it evolved. It can therefore be distinguished from both hierarchical and digital infrastructures 
more broadly, as discussed further below. 
The case of the Bitcoin blockchain is instructive in providing insight into the larger phenomenon 
of self-organising (Anderson 2012), generativity associated with blockchain infrastructures 
(Siggelkow 2007; Wörner et al. 2016), and ultimately organising as a more autonomous process 
mediated by technological capabilities. Moreover, as it is generally considered the parent of 
subsequent generations of blockchain infrastructures (Avital et al. 2016), its ability to generate 
self-organising is likely to help us understand the pursuit of diverging objectives in second (and 
third) generation(s) of blockchain infrastructures (e.g. Ethereum, Hyperledger, etc.). However, for 
the sake of being able to draw clear empirical boundaries we focus only on the Bitcoin blockchain 
infrastructure in this paper.  
For simplicity, we will refer to the emergent social activities around the Bitcoin infrastructure as 
the ‘community’, the heterogeneous objectives that emerge pursuant to organising as ‘organising 
objectives’, distributed ledger technology in general as ‘blockchain’, and to a specific record of 
transactions as the ‘distributed ledger’ or the ‘ledger’. 
This paper is structured as follows. First, we examine the existing literature on digital 
infrastructures to identify known organising principles and outline the differences and similarities 
between digital and blockchain infrastructures. Based on our review of existing literature, we 
substantiate the notion of self-organising in blockchain infrastructures before proposing and 
elaborating on how code changes, and code forking specifically, act as mechanisms of self-
organising. Thereafter we present the case background and research design, before showing 
how code forking in the blockchain infrastructure mediated organising shifts in the Bitcoin 
community. Finally, we discuss our research findings and their implications for self–organising 
mediated by blockchain infrastructures. 
Self-Organising in Blockchain Infrastructures 
In November 2018, the Github account for Bitcoin Core, the first generation blockchain, suggested 
that its source code has been copied for re-use over 21 000 times, that 18 500 changes had been 
made to the original source code,2 and between June 2013 to November 2018 the number of 
people following its development had risen from 2 300 to over 35 000.3 This combination of high 
levels of activity, a growing user base, and divergent goals and objectives points to the idea that 
the blockchain is not only a project with a significant following, but also one that is constantly 
adapting, leading not only to improvements in the code, but also to new permutations with new 
commercial and non-commercial objectives. These shifts, in turn, lead to self-organising in its 
community of users, developers, and miners.  
In the following we first review existing theoretical views on the interplay between infrastructures 
and organising before highlighting the specific characteristics of blockchain infrastructures that 
enable self-organising. Against this backdrop, we then conceptualise how self-organising occurs 
in, and in perpetuation of, blockchain infrastructures.  
                                                             
2 https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/network/members  
3 https://www.timqian.com/star-history/#bitcoin/bitcoin  
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Existing Views on Infrastructure Organising 
Infrastructures have been argued to possess an “…overall capacity to produce unprompted 
change driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences” (Zittrain 2006: 1980), or what is 
called generativity. The result is emergent (Edwards et al. 2007) and even ‘accidental’ progress, 
or innovation (Austin et al. 2011) through slow and incremental changes. However, previous 
studies have not explored the patterns that explain how digital infrastructures, apart from those 
wholly controlled by single organisations (Ciborra 2000; Eaton et al. 2015), generate this 
progression. This begs the question of whether infrastructures, in an age of increased automation 
and digital ubiquity, participate in their own evolution, and to what extent. Understanding how 
digital infrastructures perpetuate their own existence helps us unpack the relationship between 
digital infrastructures and social objectives during the process of (self-)organising.  
Received literature on digital infrastructures represents at least four distinct views of how social 
practices, some of them hierarchical, give rise to digital infrastructure evolution; namely through 
adaptation, inscription, interaction, and managerial choice. These views are rooted in different 
bodies of literature.  
First, adaptation views see infrastructure evolution as a result of the efforts of distributed human 
actors to adapt to their environment and to other actors (Braa et al. 2007; Hanseth et al. 2006). 
Adaptation views build on developments of complexity theory (Holland 1995; Mol and Law 2002). 
For example, Hanseth & Lyytinen (2010) argue that digital infrastructure design can account for 
the adaptability of distributed actors, and Nan (2011) explores how the use of distributed digital 
technology emerges as adaptations between users, technology and tasks.  
Second, inscription views describe how infrastructures evolve as human actors translate and 
inscribe their interests into assemblages of technological components. Building on actor network 
theory (Callon 1986; Latour 1987), inscription views emphasise the relationship between human 
actors and technology in translating and inscribing behaviour in structural terms. They see 
infrastructure evolution as changes to a set of relations between humans and technology as 
human actors mobilise resources to support some organised action (Aanestad and Jensen 2011; 
Hanseth and Monteiro 1997; Yoo et al. 2005). For example, Eaton et al. (2015) describe how the 
tuning of boundary resources by a network of distributed human actors affects digital 
infrastructure evolution.   
Third, interaction views argue that an infrastructure’s evolution entails continuous interaction 
between its users and stakeholders as they engage in sensemaking around an organised activity. 
Drawing on theories of collective learning and work practices (Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 
2000), interaction views see infrastructure evolution as a result of interactions within a community-
of-practice resulting in the formation of socio-technical relations (Pipek and Wulf 2009; Star and 
Ruhleder 1996; Vaast and Walsham 2009). For example, situated learning by OS community 
participants leads to the ability to advise others, as well as the ability to improve the code (Fang 
and Neufeld 2009). 
Finally, managerial choice views emphasise the role of management decisions in facilitating 
infrastructure evolution. Infrastructure evolution is seen as a process by which managers initiate 
and implement changes to information technology infrastructure in order to align strategic 
capabilities and strategic objectives (Beckert 1999; Child 1997). For instance, Broadbent & Weill 
(1997) explain how managers—based on their understanding of the strategic context of their 
organisation—determine the infrastructure capabilities they should implement to achieve their 
business objectives. The notion of ‘mirroring’, although rooted in a different intellectual tradition, 
is consistent with this view (Burton and Galvin 2018). 
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Table 1. Organising Principles in Digital infrastructures 
Organising 
principle 
Description Theoretical 
foundation 
Example references 
Adaptation Distributed actors adapt to their 
environment through changes in 
tasks, technology and relations 
Complexity theory Hanseth & Lyytinen (2010) 
Nan (2011) 
Inscription Existing organising practices are 
inscribed in technological artefacts 
Actor Network 
Theory 
Aanestad & Jensen (2011) 
Eaton et al. (2015) 
Yoo et al. (2005) 
Interaction Interactions in a community of 
practice resulting in new socio-
technical relations 
Collective learning 
and communities-of-
practice 
Fang & Neufeld (2009) 
Pipek & Wulf (2009) 
Managerial 
Choice 
Choice of infrastructure 
governance and organising as a 
result of informed management 
decisions 
Strategic choice 
theory 
Beckert (1999) 
Broadbent & Weill (1997) 
Child (1997) 
 
The views described above and outlined in Table 1 all share three main assumptions about 
infrastructure organising: first, that infrastructures are built upon, and follow from, pre-existing 
organised practices (Star and Ruhleder 1996). Second, in the course of infrastructure evolution, 
human behaviour is inscribed onto the technological components of the infrastructure (Hanseth 
and Monteiro 1997), and third that changes to the infrastructure require coordination among 
heterogeneous and distributed human actors (Ciborra 2000; Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010). In other 
words: human objectives and practices, including coordination, determine digital infrastructure 
evolution. 
However, the applicability of these assumptions to the Bitcoin blockchain is unclear, and has not 
been tested in previous blockchain studies. In particular, the Bitcoin blockchain has few, if any, 
pre-existing organised practices; the centrality of its recursive, code-based rules mean that it is 
not controlled exclusively by human objectives and practices, and changes to the infrastructure 
can occur even without coordinated activities.  
Our aim is not to validate these assumptions here, but rather use what we already know about 
digital infrastructures as a departure point for developing an understanding of how the 
infrastructure itself, through code-based consensus mechanisms and adoption, leads to emergent 
self-organising. In the following, we define and distinguish blockchain infrastructures before 
proposing and substantiating a specific organising mechanism: the forking of infrastructure 
capabilities pursuant to organising objectives. 
Organising in Blockchain Infrastructures 
Blockchain has much in common with other infrastructures: control is not centralised, but rather 
dynamically negotiated (Weill and Broadbent, 1998), and it is comprised of a layer of code upon 
which both platforms and applications are built and upon which organising practices rely (Tilson 
et al. 2010; Vaast and Walsham 2009). As such, it is not just an OS project maintained by a 
decentralised community, but rather a specific sub-type of digital infrastructure, which supports a 
set of unique and distributed relational practices through which it is organised (Star 1999). 
Implementations of public blockchain infrastructures (Beck et al. 2018), in particular, are best 
described as a new breed of digital infrastructure (Bygstad 2010; Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010). 
Although a blockchain infrastructure belongs to a class of digital infrastructure in that it is a 
“shared, unbounded, heterogeneous, open, and evolving sociotechnical system comprising an 
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installed base of diverse information technology capabilities and their user, operations, and design 
communities” (Tilson et al. 2010: 748), the constraining properties of the blockchain mean that 
they likely operate differently to infrastructures that have previously been studied (e.g. Iannacci 
2010; Kuk and Janssen 2013). Extant research has instead examined how ex ante organising 
structures (Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013; Star 1999) and boundary objects (Eaton et al. 2015) 
determine infrastructure organising and evolution, while acknowledging that control is often 
dynamically negotiated and not necessarily fully centralised (Weill and Broadbent, 1998).  
There are, further, at least three reasons why blockchain infrastructures behave in ways not 
previously discussed in received literature on digital infrastructure organising. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to explain all of the technicalities of blockchain technology (but see e.g. Böhme 
et al. 2015). However, three constraining properties are especially relevant in understanding self-
organising in blockchain infrastructures: distributed control (Beck et al. 2018), openness to 
manipulation of technological capabilities (Avital et al. 2016), and the generativity of organising 
objectives (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010; Nærland et al. 2017).  
First, blockchains are not just decentralised, but distributed: they consist of multiple instances of 
a ledger that are shared and maintained between a disparate group of actors linked by shared 
code and without any hierarchical social structure (Bano et al. 2017; Brenig et al. 2016; Guerini 
and Moneta 2017). Also, they are open in the sense that their technological capabilities are open 
for manipulation. In the case of public blockchain infrastructures such as Bitcoin, a community of 
distributed enthusiasts are behind these manipulations (Beck et al. 2018; Campbell-Verduyn 
2018). Many of these individuals are also members of a larger OS community used to tweaking 
code at will—and without legal or organisational impediment (Fang and Neufeld 2009). This 
openness to manipulation leads to increasing heterogeneity of both how the underlying 
infrastructure is used, and the resulting organising objectives (Ingram Bogusz and Morisse 2018). 
Put together, these characteristics mean that a new technological capability, through code, can 
be proposed and developed by anyone. Thus, the dynamics surrounding code development and 
adoption help us understand how dynamic self-organising around an emergent organising 
objective emerges. However, community adoption plays a role in determining whether new (sets 
of) capabilities are discarded or adopted en masse. Further, the source code’s characteristics and 
the features of proposed changes to the code affect how important adoption is for the evolution 
of the infrastructure. Indeed, dynamics between the source code and proposed changes, 
mediated by adoption requirements, determine whether manipulations are incorporated into the 
infrastructure at all. As such, the capabilities of new as well as pre-existing code have implications 
for how the infrastructure operates in the future. These capabilities influence organising activities 
mediated by the infrastructure, including self-organising, by enabling and limiting what members 
of the community can do. 
For instance, the distributed process whereby a new transaction is recorded ensures ledger 
immutability: a transaction is transmitted by one member of the community to others in the network 
for them to verify that it is legitimate and consistent with previous entries (e.g. so that it does not 
include already-spent tokens or come from a fake account), as well as to record it. The software 
is designed so that transactions can only be added onto the ledger after verification, and cannot 
be changed or removed once entered without changes to the entire blockchain infrastructure.4 
Should conflicting versions come to exist, the blockchain protocol stipulates that the version of 
the software, which includes the ledger, held by the majority of those doing the verification 
(‘miners’) is the ‘real’ blockchain (Nakamoto 2008; Taylor 2013). This version control system not 
                                                             
4 Although there is some discussion around how much control is required to retrospectively change the blockchain, see 
e.g. Eyal, I. and Sirer, E.G., 2014, March. Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable. In International 
Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (pp. 436-454). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
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only makes the ledger itself immutable, it makes the protocol that runs it subject to the same 
majority-rule requirement. Individual actors therefore cannot change either the ledger or the 
protocol. Instead, if one is unhappy with the capabilities of the current implementation, the OS 
nature of the code means that even fundamental infrastructure capabilities are open to 
manipulation (Nyman 2015).  
Distributed control and openness to manipulation of technological capabilities has another effect: 
for fundamental changes, known as forks, to be made to the blockchain, the majority of miners 
have to adopt them. When this occurs, those miners running the version that is in the minority are 
seen to be running a de facto alternative. That is, they are no longer running a compatible version 
of the infrastructure: neither the source code that they run nor the transactions entered into 
minority-held alternative ledger can be recognised by the original blockchain. This is, however, 
only true when the versions are inconsistent with one another; more subtle rules apply when minor 
updates of the code or consistent code additions are involved.  
The generation and adoption of new technological capabilities is thus controlled both by the rules 
and the content of the pre-existing code, and by a distributed community of miners, developers, 
and users (Catalini and Gans 2016). Blockchain infrastructures thus differ substantially from both 
the hierarchical and digital infrastructures previously studied, as outlined above and summarised 
in Table 2. While understanding how they self-organise builds on existing understandings of digital 
infrastructures, it also allows us to better understand next generation applications of blockchain 
and related distributed and autonomous technologies. 
 
Table 2. A Comparison of Hierarchical, Digital, and Blockchain Infrastructures 
Technical and Social 
Characteristic(s) 
Hierarchical 
Infrastructure 
Digital Infrastructure Blockchain 
Infrastructure 
Technological capabilities Clear base of 
technological capabilities 
(e.g. enterprise systems) 
Fluid technological 
capabilities (e.g. digital 
platforms) 
Fluid technological 
capabilities, open to 
manipulation (e.g. digital 
ecosystems) 
Membership Clear boundaries, typically 
drawn along firm 
boundaries 
Large and heterogeneous 
community (fluid 
boundaries) 
Large, heterogeneous and 
pseudonymous 
community (fluid 
boundaries) 
Mode of control Centralised control 
(Control by a hierarchical 
organisation) 
Decentralised control 
(Control relegated across 
organisational 
boundaries) 
Distributed control 
(Control through network 
of distributed verifier 
nodes) 
Instantiation of control Coordination by 
organisation members 
Designed-in control 
mechanisms (e.g. through 
boundary resources or 
control points) 
Consensus mechanisms 
contained in code 
Organising objectives Defined top-down Interdependent, but often 
centralised objectives 
Complex 
interdependencies, 
generative objectives 
 
We now move on to explore self-organising in a blockchain infrastructure and how it is actualised 
through code forking.   
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Forking as Self-Organising in Blockchain Infrastructures 
Given the fact that the evolution of blockchain infrastructure capabilities—and therefore 
organising—is distributed and emergent, what happens when there is a disagreement about the 
future of the infrastructure, or what capabilities it should have or enable, from within the 
community? In a non-distributed or proprietary setting (‘hierarchical infrastructure’), the 
disagreement would be solved with reference to the organisation’s hierarchy (Burton and Galvin 
2018; Dahlander and Magnusson 2005; Kartseva et al. 2010). However, among both digital and 
blockchain infrastructures, the answer is less simple: in general, members of the community try 
to come to a negotiated settlement (Nyman 2015). In addition to this, blockchain infrastructures 
rely not just on the protocol at a set point, but also on the historical ledger generated over time. 
On a practical level, it means that compatibility is determined both based on what the protocol 
looks like at the time of inquiry, and whether a proposed change is backwards- or forwards-
compatible with the existing blockchain infrastructure. This temporality means that a 
disagreement so fundamental that it splits the community may lead to the emergence of two (or 
more) inconsistent versions of a blockchain infrastructure.  
Previous research into hierarchical organisations has suggested that alignment between 
technologies’ capabilities and organising objectives not only allows for the effective pursuit of 
changing organising objectives (e.g. Burton and Galvin 2018; Marwaha and Willmot 2006; Tiwana 
et al. 2010), but that sustained effectiveness requires that technologies evolve in line with 
changing organising objectives (Hirschheim and Sabherwal 2001). Thus, within established 
organisations, researchers have examined not just the phenomenon of artefact-organisation 
alignment, but also pointed to the importance of adaptive evolution of this alignment in line with 
evolving infrastructure capabilities and organisational objectives. This research has suggested 
that 1) digital artefact modularity, or the decomposability of a system into components with limited 
interdependence (Simon 1962), and 2) a loosely-coupled organisational structure (Tiwana and 
Konsynski 2010), facilitate this adaptive alignment. Indeed, modularity and loose coupling give an 
organisation both the flexibility to add and subtract functionality on a technical level, and the agility 
to do so with limited intervention from the rest of the organisation (e.g. Hagel 2002, Tiwana and 
Konsynski 2010). 
What results is what has been called ‘mirroring’, where the organising objectives that govern an 
infrastructure reflect its underlying technology (Colfer 2007; Colfer and Baldwin 2016). Such 
mirroring has been identified for instance in areas around organisational control (e.g., Weill and 
Ross 2005; Tiwana and Konsynski 2010), as well as pursuant to product development and 
delivery (e.g. Colfer and Baldwin 2016; MacDuffie 2013). Mirroring has been argued to occur for 
reasons around effectiveness (Burton and Galvin 2018). Arguing from the perspective of 
transaction cost economics, Burton and Galvin (2018) point to how hierarchies are superior to 
decentralised markets because they allow for more effective pursuit of goals (see also Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006), and reduce technological uncertainty and information overload 
(Weber and Mayer 2014, 345). However, extant research has pointed to how high levels of 
infrastructural complexity might make it more effective to ‘mist’ the mirror: making alignment and 
adaptive alignment more limited (Burton and Galvin 2018). This observation has been echoed in 
studies of OS committal structures: when tasks are routine and risks are low, centralised control 
is thought to be the most effective form of governance (AlMarzouq et al. 2015). However, 
centralisation and hierarchies are thought to have a chilling effect on innovation (Gawer and 
Cusumano 2014), and to be less effective forms of management when tasks are complex and 
high-risk (AlMarzouq et al. 2015). Thus, when an infrastructure is complex, emergent and not 
centrally controlled, as with a blockchain infrastructure, not only is alignment with formal 
organisational objectives tricky, it is likely to be ineffective.  
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An increasing number of digital infrastructures are neither developed nor maintained by 
hierarchical organisations, most notably those developed and governed by OS communities 
(O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007) and in innovation ecosystems (Wareham et al. 2014). Blockchain 
infrastructures are a relatively recent addition to this list. Although transaction cost economics 
would suggest that such distributed organisations are ineffective and characterised by high levels 
of uncertainty, research has shown that non-centralised organisations not only develop new 
modes of governance and control (O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007), but also deal with uncertainty 
and information overload in different ways to hierarchical organisations (Jones et al. 2004). In the 
case of the blockchain infrastructure, we propose that one way in which both control and 
effectiveness are maintained in the face of complexity and temporal dynamism is through the 
‘generative mirroring’ of infrastructure capabilities and organising objectives, in this case through 
blockchain forking.  
Forking of infrastructure capabilities takes place when source code is copied and modified in spin-
outs known as ‘forks’. Forking is defined as when “a part of a development community (or a third 
party not related to the project) starts a completely independent line of development based on the 
source code basis of the project” (Robles and González-Barahona 2012, 137). Code forks are 
typically frowned upon because they negatively affect community and individual developers’ 
reputations (Nyman 2015; Weber 2004), and because multiple, incompatible versions of a 
software can discourage related future development (Meeker 2008; Nyman 2015). Nevertheless, 
both within and beyond existing communities, forks in the source code are a visible reflection of 
changes in organising objectives. As such, the notion of code forking—in combination with 
mirroring of infrastructure capabilities and organising objectives—provides a theoretical lens 
through which digital infrastructure evolution can be studied.  
We distinguish three kinds of forks; the pseudo-fork, which repurposes existing source code and 
therefore has no compatibility issues, development forks, which are forward-incompatible insofar 
as they build capabilities that add to the code in the existing ledger, and the hard fork, which 
creates a fork that is either forward- or both forward- and backward-incompatible (Fang and 
Neufeld 2009; Raymond 1999). 
The first two types, pseudo- and development forks, involve the distribution of the original code 
along new channels. The resulting new distributions of the code are compatible with the old 
version (backward-compatible) and benefit from future developments in the parent code (forward-
compatible) (Nyman 2015). In the case of pseudo-forks, existing source code is repurposed and 
the fork allows for the application of existing capabilities to achieving new organising objectives. 
This allows for ‘variation’ in organising objectives without challenging or requiring changes to 
existing infrastructure capabilities. Development forks, by adding new capabilities, or new code, 
to the existing code base while maintaining backward-compatibility of the ledger, ‘adapt’ 
infrastructure capabilities to serve new organising objectives. In contrast, hard forks entail a 
fundamental change to the underlying code such that the new and the old versions of the 
blockchain are both forward- and backward-incompatible. While other forks vary or adapt existing 
organising objectives, hard forks support and reproduce radically new objectives that are 
incompatible with existing capabilities. The radical differences between them may extend to the 
creation of whole new communities, with new norms and objectives, or separate infrastructures 
within the same community. As a mode of self-organising, we therefore refer to hard forking as 
leading to ‘speciation’ or ‘bifurcation’ (Andersen and Ingram Bogusz 2017). 
In summary, both the forward and backward compatibility of changes to source code are 
potentially at issue when forks to a blockchain infrastructure occur. These determine the extent 
of the adoption required for a fork to actualise changes in organising, together with both the 
capabilities of the original source code and the characteristics of any proposed fork. This is 
because a blockchain infrastructure contains an immutable record with temporal reference points. 
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What follows is a description of how we unpacked forking as self-organising through a longitudinal 
multi-method research design. 
Research Design  
In order to answer the research question of how blockchain infrastructures evolve new forms of 
self-organising, we conducted a longitudinal multi-method study (Venkatesh et al. 2013) of 
generativity in the Bitcoin blockchain infrastructure over a period of six years. In the following 
section, we first discuss our case selection and its background before detailing our data collection 
and analysis methods. 
Our choice of case was driven by the need to meet four basic requirements: first, the infrastructure 
had to be predominantly self-organising in the sense that the organisation around it would have 
emerged in tandem with identifiable technological changes. Second, we had to be able to identify 
distinct instances of forking. Third, the case setting needed a history spanning over a longer period 
of time allowing us to study it in both detail and at scale. Finally, the infrastructure needed good 
records of both code forking and organising practices to allow us to analyse the dynamics of code 
forking and self-organising.    
The Bitcoin blockchain is self-organising, relatively long lived, and has good digital trace records, 
and therefore fulfils these requirements. Although the OS software has been re-used to create 
new infrastructures (e.g. Ethereum, Ripple), these next generation applications are still emergent 
and, as cases, are still nascent and therefore trickier to study (Yin 2003).  
Data Collection and Analysis 
Our aim with this research was to identify instances of forking as self-organising, as well as to 
tease out their antecedents and implications, in order to understand self-organising in blockchain 
infrastructures more generally. To this end, we needed to establish a sequence of forking events, 
and explicate both the patterns that generated them, and their consequences. Our data collection 
and analysis therefore took into account these objectives.  
Overall, our methods were grounded in inductive reasoning and rested on the use of two sources 
of data: digital trace data from the Bitcoin online community, and extensive documentation (see 
Table 3). This was in order to 1) imbue our computational findings with context, as provided by 
documents (Gaskin et al. 2014), and 2) to ensure the veracity of our findings. 
Our primary data source was forum data, which we supplemented with documentary data. 
Although it is commonplace to study code repositories when examining code-level activities (e.g. 
Dabbish et al. 2012), a weakness of this approach is that it does not capture either the context in 
which code-level activities (forks) occur, or their implications. In contrast, forum data provides 
good records of both when forks occurred (or even potentially could have occurred) and the 
underlying social context (Gaskin et al. 2014). Forum data was therefore chosen over code 
repositories as our primary data source because our main focus was to analyse a specific 
phenomenon, namely self-organising in blockchain infrastructures (in line with Grisot et al. 2014), 
rather than to follow an OS development project through a code repository (Howison and 
Crowston 2014; Lindberg et al. 2016). Instead, the fine-grained semantic data contained in the 
forums allowed us to interrogate the motivations and context in which code-level change occurred, 
as well as the corresponding changes in organising objectives and practices. Additional 
documentary data sources were used to mitigate the risk of losing context when conducting 
computational analyses (Gaskin et al. 2014) and to distinguish proposed forking events from 
actual forking events in the Bitcoin community. 
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Table 3. Overview of Data Collection and Analysis 
Data Source Description Analytical Techniques Research Outcome 
Digital traces 
314 551 digital trace 
records of interactions 
collected from the 
bitcointalk.org community 
over a six-year period, 
including records referring 
to the Bitcoin source code 
as well as organising 
changes 
Latent Dirichlet 
Allocation (LDA), the results 
of which were coded to 
identify the main forking 
events that occurred, and 
the context in which they 
occurred 
Identification of forking 
events and characterisation 
of changes in organising 
objectives during each 
forking event  
Documents 
56 Press articles 
71 Blog posts on topics 
related to forks and other 
conflicts (e.g. political 
ideologies) in the 
community from other sites 
(e.g. Bitcoinfoundation.org, 
Coindesk.com, 
Techcrunch.com, 
medium.com) 
We used open and axial 
coding to produce analytical 
memos (Miles and 
Huberman 1994) around 
the significant code forks, 
understand the background 
of the community, and 
highlight major associated 
events. This enabled us to 
verify findings in the primary 
data source, namely the 
forum data.  
Identification of 
environmental conditions 
and important demarcations 
in the history of the Bitcoin 
community 
 
We collected the digital trace records by scraping community interactions from the forum 
bitcointalk.org (Hedman et al. 2013; Howison et al. 2011). In total, we collected 314 551 
interactions posted between October 2010 and June 2016. Bitcointalk.org is a forum dedicated to 
discussions around Bitcoin, primarily in English. It is among the most prominent forums used by 
Bitcoin enthusiasts. However, unlike forums like Reddit.com, it is often used specifically by Bitcoin 
professionals meaning that interactions on Bitcointalk.org are more closely linked to the 
development of the Bitcoin code base. Furthermore, it contains sections that are both general and 
specific in nature; for instance, threads around the technicalities of the Blockchain and mining, as 
well as discussions of a more organisational nature.  
We analysed the forum data (from October 2010 to June 2016) as illustrated in Figure 1. Open 
coding of the data was conducted using the computational natural language processing technique 
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) implemented in the open source statistical software R (Blei et al. 
2003). This process of applying computational techniques to digital trace data is not new to 
Information Systems research (see, e.g., Berente et al. 2018; Hedman et al. 2013; Howison et al. 
2011). LDA is a generative topic model that reveals patterns in a set of documents by extracting 
unobserved groupings (latent themes) based on semantic similarities between different parts of 
the data (Sievert and Shirley 2014). LDA discovers latent themes within a collection of documents 
by sampling a topic for each word at every iteration of the algorithm and ranking words based on 
their relevance to each topic, which therefore has a unique distribution over words that can be 
compared using cosine similarity measures (Chuang et al. 2012). This led to the identification of 
semantic topics for each time interval, analogous to open codes in manual coding (e.g. Glaser 
and Strauss 1999). These initial open codes were then organised by the algorithm into semantic 
clusters determined by co-occurrence of terms. 
We then manually coded the resulting semantic data clusters to identify the topic of each 
‘conversation’. In many ways, this resembled the axial coding conducted in qualitative studies 
(Vaast and Walsham 2011). The process focused on identifying originating and emerging 
objectives, which we compared against analytical memos generated during the coding process, 
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and in light of our own knowledge of the community and the 127 additional documents to which 
we referred (Miles and Huberman 1994). This comparison allowed us to relate each shift in 
objective to a specific forking event, as well as identify what occurred before and after each forking 
event. Figure 1 describes the process that gave rise to Table 4, discussed in our findings, which 
provides further detail around the originating and emerging objectives, their link to specific forks, 
and the identified forking types.  
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of Data Analysis 
 
Thus, while forums provided the primary data (and supported the main analytical findings), 
analytical memos based on additional data provided vital context. The analysis combined 
computational and manual coding and analytical techniques to generate a longitudinal analysis 
of the organising objectives related to specific code forking events over six years. Based on this 
analysis, we produced a thick description (Bechky 2006) of code forking as self-organising in the 
Bitcoin community, which allowed us to explicate self-organising in blockchain infrastructures as 
a mode of organising more generally. 
Having discussed our methods and the background to our study, we turn now to presenting our 
findings, before discussing their theoretical and practical implications. 
Findings: Self-Organising in the Bitcoin Community 
Our longitudinal analysis of bitcointalk.org revealed three distinct patterns by which forking of the 
underlying infrastructure mediated the pursuit of new emerging organising objectives, and the 
resulting self-organisation through adoption. Although self-organising originated in shifts in 
objectives articulated at the level of code, adoption defined how—and to what extent—changes 
in technological capabilities supported evolving organising objectives. 
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What is interesting to note is that forks occurred in response to shifting organising objectives, and 
thus indirectly in response to changing environmental conditions. This observation is consistent 
with existing understandings of infrastructure as including organising practices and contexts, as 
well as artefacts (Star and Ruhleder 1996). As this was a longitudinal study, we could examine 
not only when and how code forking in the blockchain infrastructure supported new organising 
objectives, but also when new ideas were incorporated into the existing infrastructure. The three 
distinct forms of code forking i.e. pseudo-forks, development forks, and hard forks, their 
environmental conditions, and an overview of the sequence of forking events of importance to the 
online community are contained in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Forking of the Bitcoin Infrastructure 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, forking in the Bitcoin blockchain infrastructure sparked significant 
divergence of both source code implementations and organising objectives. Moreover, the 
occurrence of these patterns correlates with shifts in environmental conditions that encouraged 
heterogeneous groups to rally around different objectives. Of note is the fact that the underlying 
code in the blockchain only allowed some of these objectives to be actualised directly (here, 
pseudo- and development forks). Instead, a hard fork was needed if the objectives being pursued 
required a fundamental shift in the capabilities of the underlying infrastructure.  
Overall, these forks enabled either ‘variations’ on existing objectives (in the case of pseudo-forks), 
‘adaptations’ that added complementary capabilities to the blockchain infrastructure (in the case 
of development forks), or the ‘bifurcation’ of a group in order to pursue objectives inconsistent 
with what was enabled by the existing version of the infrastructure, sometimes even leading to a 
new ‘species’ of infrastructure (where a hard fork was required). These shifts, summarised by 
forking type, are described in Table 4 and elaborated upon further below.   
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Table 4. Forking Types and Associated Shifts in Organisational Objectives  
Forking Type Forking Events (Fn) 
Originating 
Objectives (On) 
Emerging 
Objectives (On) Illustrative Quotes 
Pseudo-
forking (M1) 
F1: Darknet O1: Providing a 
decentralised 
alternative to the 
financial system  
O1: To illicit 
purposes for own 
gain 
Usually stuffs on dark net are illegal ones thats why its very risky to make purchases on that place 
and there are lots of smuggled or even scammers on selling too good to be true offers. April 15, 
2016, 01:37:20 PM 
F2: Hacking 
F3: Scams 
F9: Bitcoin Core 
O9: Response to 
attempts to make 
blockchain less 
distributed 
through 
increased block 
size 
O9: To defend 
existing 
distributed 
character of 
blockchain 
We need to realize that split only does harm to bitcoin ecosystem. I know that they acted a bit 
'conservatively' but it was a defensive move to protect bitcoin. Although I disagree with his 
behavior, I am deeply disappointed about how easy [redacted] is willing to split the community in 
half in excuse of an issue which can be resolved through human talk. August 11, 2015, 09:55:28 
PM 
Development 
forking (M2) 
F4: Credit 
O2: From 
generating new 
BTC at 
algorithmically 
defined pace 
O2: To adding 
capabilities of 
supplying loans 
and putting up 
capital for 
leverage 
I`ve invested about 0.1 BTC on Bitbond on an 6W Loan.Iam really exicted gettin it paid BAck. This 
is my first Investment on Bitbond. I think the rates for the Investors are pretty good and therefore it 
comes with you if you go high or low. Otherwise, of course its recommended normally to set more 
smaller Ammounts on differents loans to get it paid back.... October 22, 2015, 10:29:37 AM 
F5: Merchant 
apps 
O3: From safe yet 
technically 
complex 
transaction 
interface 
O3: To adding 
solutions for 
using Bitcoin as a 
payment 
infrastructure 
Yes, we charge a small fee for every customer, which is nothing new to Bitcoin users. We 
incentive our BlockPay merchants to grant special discounts, cash backs and loyalty rewards for 
those who pay digital. BlockPay "S" and BlockPay integrated is for free for merchants and can be 
set up within minutes. You do not need any special hardware, and the software is also for free. We 
singing up new stores every week right now. July 30, 2016, 08:20:53 AM 
F6: Sidechains 
O4: From 
ensuring 
consistency and 
decentralisation 
thus avoiding 
double spend 
O4: To 
temporarily 
mitigating the 
openness and 
decentralisation 
of Bitcoin while 
staying 
compatible with 
fundamental 
capabilities 
If both blockchains "see" each other then side chains are easy.  Let's say you want to move value 
from chain A to chain B.  The owner spends bitcoins on chain A from any address (say 1Me) into a 
well-known unspendable address (let's pretend the address prefix is 1chainBxfer).  Nodes on 
chain "B" are watching chain A, perhaps only as a SPV node to see txouts going to 1chainBxfer.  
When a suitable transaction is found and sufficiently confirmed, a coinbase txn is allowed on chain 
B that grants coins to the same addresses as the txins on chain A (1Me)…The real question is 
how to spend in both directions (2-peg is what people have been saying) when chain A is not 
aware of chain B?  I think that the general consensus is that this is impossible which is why the 
sidechain idea languished for 2 years.  April 11, 2014, 03:53:08 PM 
F7: Wallets 
O5: From storing 
BTC on heavily 
encrypted, highly 
technical 
systems  
O5: To making it 
safe and 
convenient for 
individuals to 
store BTC 
There's a gap between secure, convenient, and cheap. If you trust me, I sell paper bitcoin wallets 
in the mail. That's convenient and cheap, and only insecure to the extent that you're trusting me to 
not rip you off, otherwise they bulletproof.  
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If I were to write this program to run on a gadget I could sell you that printed your addresses on a 
roll of paper, then it'd be secure and convenient, but not cheap. And of course, compiling these 
programs is secure and cheap (free), but not convenient.  
The closer these three points of the triangle come together, the sooner Bitcoin will take off into the 
stratosphere. August 04, 2011, 04:32:03 AM 
Hard forking 
(M3) 
F8: Ethereum 
O6: From proof-
of-concept for 
alternative 
financial 
infrastructure and 
system 
O6: To building a 
new generation 
platform for 
blockchain 
infrastructures 
When the grand experiment that is bitcoin began, the anonymous wizard desired to test two 
parameters- a trustless, decentralized database enjoying security enforced by the austere 
relentlessness of cryptography and a robust transaction system capable of sending value across 
the world without intermediaries. Yet the past five years years have painfully demonstrated a third 
missing feature: a sufficiently powerful Turing-complete scripting language. Up until this point, 
most innovation in advanced applications such as domain and identity registration, user-issued 
currencies, smart property, smart contracts, and decentralized exchange has been highly 
fragmented, and implementing any of these technologies has required creating an entire meta-
protocol layer or even a specialized blockchain. January 23, 2014, 11:33:17 AM 
F10: Bitcoin XT O7: Refactoring 
the Bitcoin 
infrastructure so 
that it can handle 
larger transaction 
volumes (through 
increased block 
size) 
O7: To 
refactoring the 
Bitcoin 
infrastructure so 
that it can handle 
larger transaction 
volumes 
Objectively superior features are developed elsewhere, they may be integrated into Bitcoin. In fact, 
many already have been. This is where the problem is... consensus takes time in Bitcoin, and a lot 
of people with personal agendas are influencing the ultimate consensus. These private 
technologies will have a centralized organization and they will adapt quickly to the needs of the 
centralized organization and developers will have little say in the matter. They will just be 
employed to make the changes forced down on them by these organizations. Bitcoin can adopt 
many of these improved features, BUT the slow consensus system will hamper their progress in 
the future. The debate about the block size have been going on for years... How much longer will a 
major change or a added feature take, to reach consensus? April 04, 2016, 05:50:16 PM 
F11: Bitcoin 
Classic 
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M1: Pseudo-Forks as Organisational Variation  
One of the most compelling patterns of self-organising that emerged from our longitudinal 
examination was how the flexibility of the blockchain source code not only drove substantial 
changes in infrastructure capabilities, but also permitted variation in the fulfilment of organising 
objectives when the environment called for them. These instances of variation are visible in forks 
F1, F2, F3 and F9, with the first three relating largely to the use of Bitcoin for illicit purposes, and the 
last related to the juxtaposition and re-labelling of the existing blockchain as ‘Bitcoin Core’ in 
response to a hard fork.5 
Figure 3 illustrates how the relative importance of pseudo-forking events increased over time 
within the Bitcoin community. The pseudo-forks F1, F2, and F3 show the same overall pattern: a 
gradual increase in interest over time, with no sharp breaks or sharp increases in interest over 
time (but see discussion of F9 below).  
Figure 3 further illustrates the significance of June 2011: at this point, the community started to 
grow significantly. The number of unique users in the community increased from 164 to 1847 and 
community activity spiked from 2413 interactions in April to 19 159 interactions by June 2011. A 
number of key events occurred at around this time: first, WikiLeaks and other prominent 
organisations began to accept the Bitcoin currency (BTC); second, the ‘2011 bubble’ saw BTC 
prices soar to over 30 USD, only to burst in the following week when accounts at the prominent 
Mt.Gox Bitcoin exchange were compromised and BTC with a nominal value of over 8 750 000 
USD was lost (Ingram Bogusz and Morisse 2018). The combination of an increase in users, and 
the publicity around these events introduced heterogeneous and diverse objectives to the Bitcoin 
community. Moreover, this heterogeneity becomes visible as new users either build, or create the 
market conditions for new capabilities in the blockchain infrastructure.  
 
 
  
Figure 3.  Activity Relating to Pseudo Forks 
 
                                                             
5 This relation to a hard fork explains why the corresponding graph in Figure 2 shows steeper growth pattern than the 
remaining pseudo forks, which are more autonomous  
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During the early stages of the evolution of Bitcoin in 2011 and 2012, increased heterogeneity in 
the blockchain community meant that users began to see the new blockchain infrastructure as 
ripe for conducting transactions outside the established financial system: 
…I saw many a lot of devious schemes to earn bitcoin. Just like HYIP, PONZI, Gambling, Bet etc. 
I am very afraid of RIBA. therefore, for guidance and assistance will be appretiated. Thanks – 
March 03, 2012, 12:38:21 AM  
However, other users were quick to point out how some pseudo forks, notably the ones identified 
above, broke with norms within the community—and did not represent the objectives of the 
community as a whole. Nor should these forks be considered synonymous with the technology 
itself, even though it enabled them: 
Of course, bitcoin is not the problem. People who misuse the bitcoin and abuse is are the ones 
who are the problem. If terorrist are using bitcoin, not really nice of them to shed bitcoin in a bad 
light. - November 24, 2015, 02:36:19  
While ‘unpopular’ variations dominated, the contextualising of the existing code in response to a 
split in the community (which also preceded a hard fork) also led to a specific kind of pseudo-fork, 
namely the defensive re-labelling of existing code.  
Defensive Pseudo-Fork 
Where changing social objectives were seen as ‘legitimate’ by the community, and thus widely 
adopted, what resulted was not a hard fork but a pseudo-fork: the same set of code was infused 
with new social meaning (here F9, in May 2015). Our data showed one instance of this occurring, 
which came in response to a hard fork (F10). It followed similar patterns to a hard fork, namely a 
sudden rise in interest (see Figure 3), but did not require a change at the level of code to be 
realised. Instead, defenders of the existing infrastructure labelled the existing infrastructure ‘Core’, 
highlighting how its capabilities, and degree of distribution in particular, emerged from a set of 
‘core’ organising goals, notably around democratic control of the infrastructure. Much like the 
variations in practice represented by the use of the infrastructure for illicit transactions, this kind 
of fork was an instance of practice-level variation to how the infrastructure was used:  
The code which powers the Bitcoin network can be found here: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin. 
This code has evolved as long as Bitcoin has been around. But the debate over the block size 
limit and how to manage it has caused some of the best-known developers to set up another 
client for bitcoin, here: https://github.com/bitcoinxt/bitcoinxt... The former is now referred to as 
"Bitcoin Core", and the latter "Bitcoin XT". … From the XT github README: "Bitcoin XT is more 
experimental than Bitcoin Core, and has a strong emphasis on supporting the needs of app 
developers and merchants. By running it you not only provide additional services to the network 
but help build confidence in the implementations, contributing towards consensus for inclusion in 
a future version of Bitcoin Core. - May 31, 2015, 05:28:36 PM 
Pseudo-forks, while seemingly something out of the ordinary, did not entail any underlying code 
change. They simply entailed variation in code use patterns—but nevertheless ones that 
mediated the pursuit of new objectives, notably ones opposed by other members of the 
community. Indeed, this opposition—and the freedom to pseudo-fork despite it—was 
commonplace and was made possible by the nature of the blockchain infrastructure itself. The 
qualities of distribution and semi-anonymity—seen as elements of building a new technical 
system based on trust in a system rather than individuals or institutions—paradoxically gave users 
the possibility to repurpose the system for transactions that many in the community considered to 
be unethical, including involving drugs on the Darknet (F1) and Bitcoin-denominated scams (F3).  
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Pseudo-forks thus occurred when the existing code facilitated variation in organising objectives. 
These variations on organising objectives emerged from divergent goals and ideologies, and were 
manifested through forks to the infrastructure’s capabilities. Interpretation, narrative and other 
events led to the emergence of these variations, while the pre-existing code limited (and enabled) 
the possible interpretations. Moreover, pseudo-forks attracted additional community members 
and influenced dynamics between existing members, affecting how the community interacted.  
Having described how pseudo-forks enable and constrain self-organising by enabling changes in 
organising objectives to existing source code, we now look closer at how self-organising manifests 
when the changes to infrastructure capabilities are more substantial.  
M2: Development Forks as Organisational Adaptation  
Variations in organising objectives were not the only forms of self-organising mediated by forking. 
Adaptation, or development that added to infrastructure capabilities through modular 
development of the underlying source code, was also an important and influential mediator of self-
organising.  
These development forks enabled new capabilities by building upon the existing source code, 
which led to adaptation in the community. Adaptation thus enabled additional organising 
objectives through the creation of new infrastructure capabilities that built upon the existing source 
code without introducing incompatible elements.  
As shown in Figure 4, the events of June 2011 attracted not only those with criminal or malicious 
intent, but also entrepreneurs, whom saw the potential for Bitcoin to be extended to delivering a 
range of financial and other services, most notably building credible merchant and retail solutions 
(F5) and building wallets for use by Bitcoin users and investors (F7). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Activity Relating to Development Forks 
 
Both giving credit (F4) and developing sidechains (F6) were dramatic changes to the blockchain 
widely discussed in the community in early 2014. However, while giving credit was incompatible 
with the infrastructure’s capabilities and therefore could not be realised (without a hard fork), 
sidechains required mere addition to the source code—and therefore the organising objectives 
that they represented, namely the transfer of assets other than BTC through the blockchain, could 
be realised.  
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As these developments built upon the existing source code, they enabled the pursuit of new 
objectives, i.e. enabling retail and credit services, through the creation of start-ups that built 
complementary additions to the infrastructure. Among the ventures that started at this time are a 
number of Bitcoin exchanges6 that are still successful in 2019, namely Bitstamp and Kraken, and 
the successful wallet Blockchain.info.7 However, new adaptations were only accepted by the 
community under certain conditions, as one member of the community expressed:  
Please understand that I have great respect for the work you’ve done. Your service is very well 
constructed and well-loved for good reason.  While some of the things I’ve brought up might be 
improved with some tweaks here and there, much of it is simply the structural consequences of 
centralized services, trusted parties, web clients, etc…I don’t think our community should take 
any actions which promote centralization or consolidation due to systemic risk if nothing else… I 
don’t believe it should promote your wallet service either. - December 03, 2012, 03:02:53 PM 
But entrepreneurship did not just extend to services that catered to the existing community. 
Instead, some of the adaptations mediated by development forks allowed the infrastructure to 
interface with other infrastructures, enabling inter-organisational linkages. One example is that of 
a Point-of-Sale (PoS) adaptation (F5), which built both upon the underlying infrastructure and on 
other adaptations to extend the usefulness of the infrastructure and include new users: 
We have released an update of our Pos [Point-of-Sale] software witch includes a module to 
connect and process payments trough Bitcoin-Qt wallet. So with this update, more than 3000 local 
busineses over the world who now are using Sysme Pos as point of sale software can have the 
tool to accept Bitcoins We hope that this will encourage them to accept Bitcoin as payment so 
this this project can make a step further. - June 05, 2013, 09:53:11 PM 
Such an addition was not only useful on the level of infrastructure capabilities, it also served to 
include more stakeholders in supporting and engaging with Bitcoin’s organising objectives. Not 
only did the creation of entirely new adaptations on the level of code, through development forks, 
mediate the pursuit of new organising objectives, they also expanded the number of stakeholders 
with an interest in the blockchain. Indeed, development forks like the creation of wallets and 
merchant services created new interdependencies by 1) integrating Bitcoin better into the 
established financial system by creating services for merchants and points at which bitcoins could 
be exchanged for fiat currencies like USD; and 2) linking Bitcoin and the blockchain to other 
related technologies, for instance in the creation of offline bitcoin wallets reliant on new pieces of 
hardware (e.g. Hurlburt and Bojanova 2014). 
Among the adaptations that built upon the infrastructure are those that would allow, in an indirect 
way, the infrastructure to perform additional functions. While the blockchain’s original architecture 
was intended as a proof-of-concept for the transfer of a currency, one adaptation allowed for the 
transfer and maintenance of a centralised database of assets other than that currency. In an 
adaptation known as a sidechain (F6), developers built upon the blockchain to allow for an asset-
agnostic transfer which interfaced with the blockchain: 
The paper proposes two-way pegged sidechains as an extension mechanism for Bitcoin.  The 
idea is that coins would be able to move from the Blockchain, to a sidechain, and then back again 
in a trustless way.  This would allow sidechains to implement properties that are not feasible to 
implement on Bitcoin itself, while preserving the total number of Bitcoins. - September 10, 2015, 
03:44:19 PM 
                                                             
6 Analogous to currency exchanges, Bitcoin exchanges allow users to exchange Bitcoins for fiat currencies like the US 
Dollar or Euro, and vice versa 
7 Also analogous to a physical wallet, Bitcoin wallets served as a storage facility for Bitcoin access keys, whether online 
or offline 
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Though it represented a drastic development, this fork was still consistent with the underlying 
source code. This meant that, like in forks F5 and F7, the new objectives facilitated by the 
adaptation also relied on elements of the infrastructure’s coded-in organising practices in order to 
function. Thus, adaptation was enabled (and constrained) by source code, through development 
forks. These development forks added to existing organising by attracting new users to the 
community, and by making the infrastructure itself able to support more things—thus changing its 
characteristics and capabilities on the code level. 
Creative Adaptations  
However, although some adaptations could be considered plain sailing, others were incompatible 
with the underlying infrastructure. Therefore, the underlying infrastructure could not support their 
pursuit. One example of this was in the creation of credit (F4): 
I'm not being misleading, the services offered by your current credit union could be extended to 
Bitcoins. This is a real institution with full financial services we're talking about so everything is on 
the table for the steering committee to discuss. Mortgages, Credit Cards, LOC, metals, multi 
currency handling (fiat and BTC), insurance etc. September 11, 2012, 04:28:10 PM 
The fact that the creation of new BTC was limited by the blockchain’s consensus mechanism 
meant that more could not be created just to support the leverage implicit in granting credit (Leland 
and Toft 1996). However, a creative credit-like adaptation was instead developed, namely the 
granting of peer-to-peer loans:  
I am familiar with BTCPop, BTCJam, and Bitlendingclub (BLC). I love the concept of peer to peer 
lending as a way of disrupting traditional banking, and I love bitcoin. The two ideas work beautifully 
together - although unfortunately I don't think any company out there is doing it right yet. For 
example, loans are supposed to be tied to an interest rate, so that the sooner you repay the less 
interest you pay. This occurs with all traditional commercial debt, from mortgages to car loans to 
credit cards. All the bitcoin platforms, on the other hand, only calculate the debt over the term of 
the loan as a lump sum, so if you pay late or early it doesn't matter - you pay the same interest. 
So, for just one example, it makes no sense to refinance any debt to a lower interest rate. I'm 
hoping they do away with that soon or a competitor pops up which does. Peer to peer lending 
thrives on markets and it needs those options to be there. May 09, 2015, 04:31:21 PM 
In early 2013, the development of peer-to-peer loans was seen as both a merit of the blockchain 
and a possible stumbling block to greater integration of the mainstream and Bitcoin financial 
systems. Altering the system so that it could issue credit would have required a substantial change 
to the blockchain infrastructure. Unlike the Bitcoin XT change (F10) discussed below, the 
environmental pressure exerted in favour of giving credit was not (at the time) sufficient to drive 
the hard fork it would take to make it a reality. As such, it was a hypothetical hard fork that never 
reached the adoption threshold required to support a separate infrastructure with new capabilities. 
However, the environmental conditions that supported the idea of credit instead gave rise to 
another creative adaptation, namely the creation of unleveraged peer-to-peer loans. 
M3: Hard Forks as Bifurcation and Speciation  
The most dramatic pattern of self-organising we observed was driven by a hard fork to the 
underlying code; that is, a fork in the code that created a new infrastructure that was both 
forwards- and backwards- incompatible with the existing infrastructure. If the community had 
adopted this ‘forked’ version of the code en masse, it would have become the dominant 
infrastructure. In fact, one might even say that it would become the infrastructure, while the 
versions of the code were either discarded or held by a less influential minority as a minority 
infrastructure. We refer to this pattern as ‘bifurcation’, as it resulted in two (or several) incompatible 
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and competing infrastructures. The fact that a hard fork was necessary to pursue the creation of 
a new set of capabilities implied that, despite the substantial code-level similarities that they 
shared, at the level of code they are fundamentally incompatible.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 5. Activity Relating to Hard Forks  
 
A particularly illustrative example is that of the Bitcoin XT (‘XT’, F10): it not only resulted in a new 
infrastructure, but also the defensive pseudo-fork Bitcoin Core (F9) described earlier. In June 2015 
two prominent developers of the Bitcoin source code suggested that the sustainability of the 
blockchain infrastructure was in jeopardy. This was because, in late 2015, the infrastructure 
began to struggle to handle the number of Bitcoin transactions being conducted; there were 
delays and a backlog of transactions grew. Moreover, as demand was consistently increasing, 
the infrastructure needed better handling capacity—and the infrastructure did not have a built-in 
way to scale. In other words, the infrastructure began to fail (Hearn 2015). An infrastructural shift, 
known as Bitcoin XT, was proposed as a solution. This proposed solution would entail increasing 
the size of each block in the blockchain from 1mb to 4mb, which would require a fundamental 
change in the underlying source code: 
As Bitcoin has grown, so have the blocks. Reasonable traffic projections indicate that as Bitcoin 
spreads via word of mouth, we will reach the limit of the current system [with a 1mb block size] 
sometime next year, or by 2017 at the absolute latest. And another bubble or press cycle could 
push us over the limit before even that. The result might not be pretty. So it is now time to raise 
the [block size] limit, or remove it entirely. - Mike Hearn, Aug 15, 2015 
Bitcoin Classic (F11), like XT before it, also proposed to increase the size of each block in the 
blockchain. Both aimed to facilitate processing a larger number of transactions more quickly. 
However, the blockchain protocol would also need to change fundamentally to allow for this. 
Moreover, increasing the block size would reduce the number of miners able to run the software 
(owing to issues around processing power), even as it increased the blockchain’s transaction 
handling capacity. The rules for how a change to the operating protocol of the blockchain could 
occur were enshrined in the source code. In essence, minor changes that created compatible 
versions of the software were easily dealt with, while major changes, like this hard fork, required 
active adoption beyond a certain threshold. Participants in the network, whether miners or 
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entrepreneurs running platforms on the blockchain infrastructure, had to choose which version to 
run. Ultimately, the version that garnered the most support became the ‘real’ blockchain.  
Opponents of this change labelled the original version of the infrastructure Bitcoin Core, and they 
argued that, among other things, XT was untried and may not scale well (with which XT 
proponents disagreed). They also argued that the change would make the project more 
centralised, putting more power in the hands of fewer miners—who could make more drastic 
changes in the future. OS communities often identify strongly with the underlying project (Ingram 
Bogusz and Morisse 2018; Ren et al. 2012), so controversial attempts to change it were often 
taken personally: 
Bitcoin’s own former lead dev, Gavin, and his henchman Hearn are in the process of sabotaging 
Bitcoin from the inside. You will hear about it  when their XT Trojan horse deploys its payload, 
and attempts to force us all to join their altcoin at Bitcoin’s expense. - July 9, 2015, 03:42:23 PM 
This back-and-forth shows how the political environment affected how code changes were 
perceived and framed, which affected the community’s willingness to adopt new changes. In 
essence, they agreed with the need to do something, but argued that the technical shift to XT 
would change the social practices whereby the infrastructure operated by centralising control of 
the source code.  
The blockchain source code ultimately bifurcated into in two forward- and backward-incompatible 
versions of the blockchain, within the same community. As miners did not adopt the XT version 
of the code in sufficient numbers, it never became the dominant version of the infrastructure. 
Moreover, swathes of the Bitcoin community also boycotted entrepreneurs and users who 
switched over to XT. Unlike with a development fork, wherein the new version of the infrastructure 
was compatible with those running the old version of the software, a hard fork meant that those 
running pre-fork versions of the infrastructure were unable recognise the changes. 
A further hard fork, labelled Ethereum (F8), revolved around alternative uses of blockchain-like 
infrastructures other than for Bitcoin, driven at least partly by the limitations the blockchain was 
seen to have at the time: 
They can make an altcoin and voila, they'll have a blockchain. But there's no stronger blockchain 
than Bitcoin's. And if that's advertised enough, organizations will come for the blockchain and will 
have to use bitcoin for that. For the moment, the bitcoin blockchain is the most 'used' and it is the 
most secure but like I said "for the moment". However it is normal that in the future someone will 
build something better than the actual bitcoin (this is obvious... technology). - July 15, 2015, 
07:56:16 PM 
Users pointed both to the fact that Bitcoin transactions were slow (as we saw in the motivation for 
Bitcoin XT), and to the fact that the blockchain in its then-incarnation did not easily allow for the 
storage of other kinds of information, assets, or the execution of smart contracts. Although the 
originating objective behind Ethereum was to facilitate the use of blockchain technology for other 
kinds of applications, for instance smart contracts, the extent of the code-level changes involved 
and the threshold for adoption was sufficiently high that this generated a whole new species of 
blockchain with its own distinct community. The resulting Ethereum blockchain infrastructure, with 
its separate community and incompatible code base, was both operationally and ideologically 
distinct from the parent community, or a different species.  
Having discussed how the three different types of forks outlined in the literature lead to four distinct 
patterns of self-organising, we turn to discussing how these findings inform emerging theory on 
blockchain infrastructures, specifically by relating them to generativity and self-organising.  
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Discussion and Contributions 
This paper makes the following main contributions to our understanding of forking as a pattern of 
self-organising in blockchain infrastructures. First, it provides a vocabulary for forking as self-
organising in blockchain infrastructures that extends the emerging body of research on the role 
of blockchain in organising (Avital et al. 2016; Beck et al. 2017, 2018; Catalini and Gans 2016). 
More specifically, it complements the literature on infrastructure evolution (Andersen and Ingram 
Bogusz 2017; Grisot et al. 2014; Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013; 
Tilson et al. 2010) by showing how forking in blockchain infrastructures leads to self-organising. 
Second, it explains how the environmental conditions surrounding forking attempts—specifically 
community adoption, heterogeneity of organising objectives, and code-level changes—enable the 
forking that mediates self-organising in blockchain infrastructures. Lastly, we discuss the 
implications of self-organising for blockchain design, forking itself, and technology-organisation 
alignment, known as ‘mirroring’. 
Our findings describe the emergent consequences of the interplay between blockchain 
infrastructures and heterogeneous organising objectives in the case the Bitcoin blockchain. In 
particular, we zoom in on forking, thus far seen as a governance phenomenon within the 
blockchain community (Beck et al. 2018) and OS communities more generally (Nyman and 
Lindman 2013), as an important pattern that enables self-organising facilitated by the medium of 
computer code. Understanding the role of forking is not just important as organisations and 
societies become more digitalised, it is also important in light of how blockchain infrastructures 
enable increasingly autonomous organising, for instance through Distributed Autonomous 
Organisation (DAOs, Beck et al. 2016, 2018). This manner of organising is not only embedded in 
a distributed infrastructure, but challenges what we already know about how distributed and 
autonomous organising occurs across technological, geographical, industry, and organisational 
boundaries. 
While the ramifications of distributed self-organising through blockchain infrastructures are 
potentially radical and far-reaching (Wörner et al. 2016), this paper focuses on the more narrow 
question of how self-organising has occurred in the past, specifically through a longitudinal study 
of the Bitcoin blockchain in its formative years, from October 2010 to June 2016.  
We now turn to elaborating on, and discussing the implications of, these findings before 
concluding and discussing directions for future research.  
Patterns of Forking as Self-Organising  
In the following, we discuss how the three forking mechanisms discussed above, namely pseudo, 
development, and hard forks, led to different patterns of self-organising by enabling or 
constraining the pursuit organising objectives. Inspired by research framing Bitcoin as an 
ecosystem (Andersen and Ingram Bogusz 2017; Gandal et al. 2018; Wörner et al. 2016) and 
consistent with extant literature on digital infrastructure evolution (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010; 
Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013), we have labelled these patterns of self-organising ‘variation’, 
‘adaptation’, 'bifurcation', and ‘speciation’ as outlined in Table 5 and Figure 6. We now discuss 
how these patterns of self-organising emerge through forking, as well as how they link to the 
pursuit of organising objectives and related adoption practices.  
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Table 5. Patterns of Self-Organising  
Pattern of Self-
Organising 
Description Forks in 
Infrastructure 
Capabilities (Fn) 
Shifts in Organising Objectives 
(On) 
 Variation 
 
(M1: Pseudo-
forking) 
Incremental development of new 
organising objectives based on 
existing infrastructure 
capabilities 
F1: Darknet O1: From providing decentralised 
alternative to the financial system 
to illicit purposes for own gain 
F2: Hacking 
F3: Scams 
F9: Bitcoin Core 
O7: Response to the Bitcoin XT 
hard fork (F9) 
Adaptation 
 
(M2: Development 
forking) 
Incremental development of new 
infrastructure capabilities and 
organising objectives  
F4: Credit 
O2: Adding capabilities of 
supplying financial services 
F5: Merchant apps 
O3: Adding solutions for using 
Bitcoin as a payment 
infrastructure 
F6: Sidechains 
O4: Temporarily mitigating the 
openness and decentralisation of 
Bitcoin while  
F7: Wallets 
O5: Making it safe and convenient 
for individuals to store BTC 
Bifurcation 
 
(M3: Hard forking) 
Radical divergence in both 
infrastructure capabilities and 
organising objectives taking 
place within the community 
F10: Bitcoin XT O6: Refactoring the Bitcoin 
infrastructure so that it can handle 
larger transaction volumes F11: Bitcoin Classic 
Speciation 
 
(M3: Hard forking) 
Spin-off into separate 
technological infrastructure self-
organised through a separate 
community 
F8: Ethereum 
O7: Building a new generation of 
blockchain infrastructure 
 
Variation refers to the process whereby existing infrastructure capabilities are employed in pursuit 
of new organising objectives. Variation in organising objectives is thus facilitated by repurposing 
and reinterpreting existing technological capabilities through pseudo-forking. These variations 
connect unrelated organising objectives to the blockchain infrastructure as in the case of hacking 
(F2), scams (F3), and the re-labelling of the Bitcoin blockchain as Bitcoin Core (F9). Variations on 
the purpose of existing capabilities do not require changes to the source code. Instead, the source 
code enables unexpected social practices in the form of new organising objectives. 
Adaptation refers to the process by which supplementary infrastructure capabilities are generated 
on top of the infrastructure’s existing capabilities, notably by adding code modules or creating 
supplementary, but compatible, capabilities. This process results in the infrastructure being used 
for new things, in new domains, and in an expansion of the blockchain user base. This results in 
compatible supplementary organising objectives operating within the existing infrastructure. 
Examples of this include the introduction of new entrepreneurial products like merchant (F5) or 
wallet (F7) applications. The added code allows not only for the pursuit of supplementary 
objectives, but also the creation of a supplementary organising and interactions reliant on the 
underlying blockchain infrastructure.  
Bifurcation refers the process by which diverging organising objectives are generated in light of  
radical breaks with existing organising objectives, inconsistent with existing infrastructure 
capabilities. The organising objectives that are pursued in this way require fundamental (and 
incompatible) changes to the capabilities of the underlying blockchain infrastructure. For 
bifurcation to occur, code changes must supplant existing infrastructure capabilities, generating 
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a new infrastructure that is technically incompatible with the pre-existing source code. Moreover, 
the social conditions under which such a hard fork occurs leads to the creation of sub-communities 
within the larger community, with new organising objectives, and not to the creation of a whole 
new community. Two examples of this, one realised and one unrealised, are the hard forks around 
BitcoinXT (F10) and Credit-enabling leverage through the infrastructure (F4). Both divided the 
existing community because they introduced centralisation to the blockchain infrastructure, a 
fundamental change to the underlying source code: Bitcoin XT did this by decreasing the number 
of miners who could run the blockchain protocol, while leverage would have required a third party 
who could control money supply. The resulting bifurcated blockchain infrastructures, thus, not 
only change the capabilities of the infrastructure, but also who could control the infrastructure: a 
departure from the distributed, non-hierarchical organisation of the parent (‘Core’. F9) 
infrastructure.  
Speciation refers to cases of bifurcation where changes in infrastructure capabilities and 
organising objectives are so divisive that they spin off into completely separate blockchain 
infrastructures with their own sets of capabilities, objectives and—crucially—communities. An 
example of speciation in the Bitcoin infrastructure can be seen in the emergence of Ethereum (F8), 
which, despite being a fork to the Bitcoin blockchain, operates independently.   
The impact of code forking, both as reflected in additions to the blockchain infrastructure and in 
how they are discussed, are relatively clear and distinct. Both variation and adaptation, generated 
by pseudo- and development forks respectively, result from compatible variations on, or additions 
to, existing code. In contrast, both bifurcation and speciation, generated by hard forks, result from 
incompatible additions to the existing source code. The overall patterns of forking and adoption 
are summarised in Figure 6 and reflected analytically in Table 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Overview of the Patterns of Self-Organising 
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Having established the consequences of forking in blockchain infrastructures, the question arises 
of how the different forks mediate these different self-organising patterns. In brief, distributed 
blockchain infrastructures’ self-organising is generated by 1) heterogeneity of organising 
objectives and 2) specific patterns of community adoption. These are discussed further below. 
Heterogeneous Objectives and Patterns of Adoption  
Research elsewhere, both within OS communities more generally (Choi et al. 2015) and the 
Bitcoin community specifically (Ingram Bogusz and Morisse 2018) has shown that online 
communities are seldom comprised of groups of individuals with homogenous shared objectives 
and ideologies. Instead, these communities have multiple, heterogeneous, and potentially 
conflicting objectives. Indeed, as our analysis above shows, the larger the community, the more 
potential variation—and potential for conflict—results. While recent research on blockchain 
generativity has shown how “…disagreements can be resolved in a decentralised manner if users 
initiate forks by copying existing code and developing it further according to their goals” (Beck et 
al. 2018: 27), the process by which this occurs, and the role of the code as infrastructure, has yet 
to be studied.  
Our analysis of the Bitcoin blockchain shows that in the face of heterogeneity, it is the pre-existing 
content of the code—what we have called infrastructure capabilities—that determines whether 
originating objectives give rise to the pursuit of compatible and complementary objectives (which 
avoid further dispute), or to diverging ones. Where existing code is either flexible or does not 
prevent a proposed objective, what results are (a set of) emerging objectives that are limited in 
scope, compatible with the existing infrastructure, and may require specific adoption in order to 
have any effect at all (see Table 6). This is true whether the objectives pursued are accepted as 
legitimate by the community, or not. Indeed, the resulting adaptation and variation cannot be 
severed from the originating infrastructure—and the code-level additions (adaptation), and new 
social employment of existing code (variation) cannot be prevented or sanctioned by the 
community. Instead, opponents can avoid adoption—a limited form of sanction (Feller et al. 2008). 
 
Table 6. Self-Organising in Blockchain Infrastructures 
 Homogenous organising 
objectives 
Heterogeneous 
organising objectives 
General adoption of 
infrastructure capabilities 
 
 
(Adoption across entire 
community) 
Bifurcation 
Divergence within the 
organisation due to radical self-
organising 
 
 (Hard fork) 
Speciation 
Spin-off into new organising 
structure (e.g. Ethereum) 
 
 
 (Hard fork) 
Specific adoption of 
infrastructure capabilities 
 
(Adoption by a specific sub-
group within or outside the 
community) 
Adaptation 
Organising around specific 
objectives, business cases etc. 
 
 
 (Development fork) 
Variation 
Organising to take advantage of 
or repurpose blockchain 
infrastructure for other ends 
 
 (Pseudo-fork) 
 
However, the capabilities of the code may also generate divergent and heterogeneous paths 
within the same infrastructure (e.g. Bitcoin XT), or the creation of distinct and incompatible 
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blockchain infrastructures (e.g. Ethereum). The key differentiator for the realisation of organising 
objectives is the scope of adoption, where adoption of a particular fork in specific sub-groups 
within the community or general adoption across the entire community influences the actual 
pattern of self-organising. Table 6 illustrates the role of adoption in generating different patterns 
of self-organising, and its link to homogenous or heterogeneous organising objectives. 
Specific Adoption 
The patterns of adoption that generate these changes, specifically the extent of code adoption, 
also affect how self-organising progresses, and what its outcome(s) are. In the case of variation 
and adaptation, adoption happens pursuant to different patterns of organising objective shifts, 
namely heterogeneous objectives given existing code (variation), and the creation of 
supplementary code by those with relatively homogenous organising objectives (adaptation). 
Moreover, specific adoption of a variation or adaptation is required, not general adoption of a new 
(blockchain) infrastructure. That is, as there are no internal limitations in the infrastructure that 
prevent the realisation of new capabilities and associated objectives. What transforms code-level 
capabilities into the realisation of new objectives is the adoption of the specific reproduction or 
repurposing of code that has occurred, not adoption of a larger code base. 
General Adoption 
In contrast, the patterns of code replacement, diverging organising objectives, and ultimate 
adoption in the face of hard forks differ substantially. Although all hard forks are prompted by 
environmental changes that motivate new objectives that are incompatible with the existing 
infrastructure, patterns around organising objectives and adoption influence the degree of self-
organising and divergence that results.  
Where there is commitment to the existing capabilities of the infrastructure within the community, 
but a desire to create additional incompatible capabilities, for instance faster processing power 
(as in Bitcoin XT), we see agreement (homogeneity) between those who would fork and those 
who remain behind. As a result, the forwards- and backwards-incompatible code changes that 
are needed for the fork occur within the fold of the existing community. For the emerging new fork 
to become the primary infrastructure, the bifurcation generated, in turn, requires a substantial 
general adoption within that community. In the absence of this general adoption, a hard fork could 
become an alternative infrastructure (with adoption by a minority), or a failed hard fork (without 
significant adoption). 
In contrast, where the existing objectives of the existing community and a new set of objectives 
share little common ground, for instance where the new objectives revolve around smart contracts 
more generally, not just currency transfers (as in Ethereum), what results is the creation of new 
capabilities through both a separate species of infrastructure and a separate community. As with 
bifurcation, the resulting new infrastructure could eclipse its parent with sufficiently large adoption. 
However, given the heterogeneous objectives involved, what would be generated is either a whole 
new species of infrastructure with substantial adoption, or a failed hard fork. 
In essence, existing code supports and reinforces the status quo, and changes to it require 
significant resources and mobilisation on the part of would-be forkers. Consequently, self-
organising through hard forks could pan out in one of four ways: 1) the hard fork could be 
absorbed by the existing infrastructure, which would require general adoption by a majority of 
users; 2) the hard fork could generate a whole new community; 3) the hard fork could generate a 
minority infrastructure; and 4) the hard fork could fail due to lack of general adoption. These four 
possible outcomes stem from individual and collective responses to an otherwise technical 
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change: both the nature of the organising objectives at play, and the threshold of adoption are 
relevant to what the generative consequences of a code forking are. 
Implications 
Overall, this paper conceptualises how forking in blockchain infrastructures generates self-
organising. More specifically, it outlines the means by which forking facilitates the pursuit of 
organising objectives, and the role of: 1) the underlying infrastructure; 2) the scale of the code 
changes; 3) individual objectives; and 4) collective adoption, whether specific or general, in this 
pursuit. By identifying four patterns of self-organising and their antecedents, this paper outlines a 
framework for assessing the potential consequences of specific forking events. Moreover, its 
conceptualisation of the antecedents of these patterns; homogenous and heterogeneous 
objectives, and thresholds of adoption needed for certain outcomes, give guides to would-be 
blockchain infrastructure designers around what to consider when developing a governance 
model. Unpacking these different mechanisms gives us insight into how a blockchain 
infrastructure could be governed to facilitate—or prevent—the different outcomes described in 
Table 6.  
Generativity and Blockchain Design 
When it comes to blockchain design, blockchain infrastructures, unlike platforms and applications, 
do not have strict boundaries and cannot be defined through a specific set of functions or modules 
(Tilson et al. 2010). Instead, their boundaries are defined through use practices, evident in the 
pursuit of organising objectives and adoption in the generation of new patterns of self-
organising—and the maintenance of old ones. Our findings reinforce the idea that the existence—
and design—of an infrastructure relies on continued use, maintenance and self-organising by a 
distributed group of users (Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013). Indeed, we build on these ideas to 
show how use and maintenance support the emergence of different patterns of self-organising. 
In particular, lowering the transaction costs of collaboration (Catalini and Gans 2016) facilitates 
the emergence of self-organising through a distributed process in which multiple users contributes 
to an underlying infrastructure (Yoo et al. 2012). This builds on findings related to committal 
structures in OS communities, where it was found that decentralisation allowed for better 
performance in situations with high levels of uncertainty (AlMarzouq et al. 2015). Here, there were 
high levels of uncertainty particularly in the case of hard forks: changes were often hotly contested 
at the level of adoption and use. Indeed, the Bitcoin community, like other OS communities, 
discouraged rogue changes through political ideology and community backlash (Dahlander and 
Magnusson 2005; Ingram Bogusz and Morisse 2018; Kirsch 1997). The open nature of the code, 
however, meant that on a technical level forking could not be prevented—and thus the patterns 
of self-organising that result could not be prevented (but may be limited or mitigated). However, 
consensus mechanism affected how open a blockchain was to generativity. It did this by 
determining the (quantitative or qualitative) threshold for when a fork generated variation and 
adaptation, or bifurcation and speciation. Fine-tuning a consensus mechanism through design 
therefore provides an avenue for the enabling or constraining of generativity—for better or worse 
(Yoo et al. 2012). 
These findings thus have implications when it comes to designing for generativity in blockchain 
infrastructures. Extant research has suggested that the design of a digital infrastructure requires 
accounting for dynamic complexity (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010), but the very nature of such 
complexity makes anticipating possible generativity tricky. However, conceptualisation of the 
specific routes that generativity could take gives designers concrete areas for consideration when 
designing blockchain infrastructures. Some specific questions include the following. First, when it 
comes to what we have called speciation and bifurcation, what are the code-level thresholds 
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involved that will lead to changes to the fabric of the infrastructure through a hard fork, and do 
such changes require general adoption of a whole infrastructure? Second, when it comes to 
complementary areas of generativity, i.e. adaptation and variation, are there limits to where and 
how additions or variations can be added to existing objectives, and what are the specific patterns 
of adoption around the code for the new objectives. These considerations, moreover, evolve as 
change is generated; thus the changes to source code and code use outlined in Figure 6 are 
relational in nature and the maintenance of the community infrastructure necessitates constant 
interaction.  
Forking 
Although the aim of this paper is not to contribute to the forking literature, but to analyse the role 
of forking in the blockchain, we have nevertheless built on literatures on forking in order to better 
understand a new kind of digital infrastructure, the blockchain. 
In particular, while extant research has referred to forking as a governance phenomenon in its 
own right (e.g. Meeker 2008; Nyman 2015), we show how forking can be part of a larger process 
of self-organising, given certain antecedents and in certain contexts. Moreover, a single kind of 
hard fork in the presence of different objectives and code capabilities can give rise to completely 
different self-organising processes. In this case, a hard fork can lead to either bifurcation, where 
a new sub-community with new objects emerges within the existing community, or to speciation, 
which is the creation of a whole new blockchain infrastructure and community that does not 
compete directly with the parent infrastructure because it has distinct technological capabilities 
and organising objectives. 
These contributions show not only that code itself is pivotal in determining, at least in the case of 
blockchain infrastructures, what organising processes result, but also that there is a complex 
dynamic between code capabilities and organising objectives that could lead to outcomes 
previously not seen or theorised within the forking literatures. 
Blockchain and Generative Mirroring 
Ultimately, extant research sees changes in organising as generating infrastructural evolution, 
rather than vice versa (e.g. Ciborra 2000; Eaton et al. 2015). By showing how self-organising is 
mediated by code forking in the blockchain, we contribute a more nuanced understanding of the 
role of the digital in its own self-organising: while intended objectives and adoption of the code 
are a vital part of organising in this context, possibilities are also defined according to the code-
level composition of an infrastructure, as seen in this specific case of the blockchain infrastructure. 
This paper further begins to build a conceptualisation of self-organisation in digital infrastructures, 
including what we call ‘generative mirroring’. Extant studies of mirroring have shown how 
organisations can mirror the characteristics of technological artefacts upon which they rely, in 
order to generate performance gains. However, this ex ante design does not reflect either the 
dynamism between digital infrastructures and distributed users and developers, or how the 
relationship between the technology and organising emerges through interaction (both social and 
at the level of code) and adoption. Instead, the distributed nature of control in blockchain 
infrastructures, i.e. through consensus mechanisms, leads not only to generativity, but also to 
generative mirroring, as the infrastructure and its community evolve in tandem. In this paper, we 
identify forking as one such mechanism of generative mirroring, but there may well be others—
especially as automation proceeds apace. This finding adds to the emerging body of literature in 
generativity in digital infrastructures (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013; 
Koutsikouri et al. 2018; Tilson et al. 2010; Um et al. 2015).  
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The findings presented in this paper have several implications for understanding organising in the 
blockchain (Beck et al. 2018; Böhme et al. 2015; Iansiti and Lakhani 2017), especially public and 
permissionless blockchain infrastructures, like Bitcoin, without a priori governing structures. 
Existing research has pointed out that organising around blockchain infrastructures is still in need 
of further research (Lindman et al. 2017), and our findings contribute in this area. A summary of 
the implications discussed above is presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Implications of Self-Organising in Blockchain Infrastructures  
 Contribution Implications 
Blockchain 
Design  
Both use practices and code capabilities 
delimit otherwise porous infrastructure 
boundaries 
The existence—and evolution—of an infrastructure 
relies on the continued practice of use, maintenance 
and self-organisation by a distributed group of users 
Lowered transaction costs of 
collaboration facilitates the emergence of 
self-organisation through forking 
Tweaking the thresholds for collaboration costs, for 
instance through the content of a consensus 
mechanism, likely to impact how generative a 
blockchain infrastructure becomes 
Forking 
Forking not just a governance 
phenomenon, but a dynamic between 
code capabilities and objectives  
The same kind of hard fork, in the presence of 
different objectives and code capabilities, can give 
rise to completely different forms of self-organising 
Blockchain 
Generativity 
While intended objectives and adoption 
of the code are a vital part of organising, 
the possibilities open are also defined 
according to the code-level capabilities of 
a blockchain infrastructure 
Challenges the existing view of digital 
infrastructures, which points to the centrality of 
human activities to organising, rather than the 
interaction of these activities with the capabilities of 
the infrastructure itself 
Generative Mirroring 
A blockchain infrastructure and its community 
evolve in tandem, through interactions between its 
technology and community with organising 
emerging through interaction (both social and at the 
level of code) and adoption 
 
Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
Digital infrastructures are gaining significance within both existing and emerging organisations 
(von Briel et al. 2018; Nambisan et al. 2018; Tilson et al. 2010) and, with the rise of blockchain 
technology, autonomous organising is less the stuff of science fiction, and increasingly a reality. 
Our examination of self-organising in the Bitcoin infrastructure contributes to conceptualising how 
blockchain infrastructures self-organise as a radical technological innovation that shapes—and is 
shaped by—organising objectives. Understanding the patterns underlying self-organising informs 
the growing body of knowledge on blockchain as an organising phenomenon, not just a 
technological one (Beck et al. 2018; Catalini and Gans 2016; Iansiti and Lakhani 2017). This 
paper provides an examination of how self-organising occurs in blockchain infrastructures, and 
the role of 1) the underlying infrastructure; 2) the scale of the code changes; 3) individual 
objectives; and 4) collective adoption, whether specific or general, in these processes. By 
identifying four patterns of self-organising and their antecedents, this paper outlines a framework 
for assessing the potential consequences of specific forking events. It builds an understanding of 
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how the specific characteristics of blockchain technology lead to new patterns of self-organising, 
and the role of forking in those patterns. 
By building an understanding of forking as a mode of self-organising in blockchain infrastructures, 
this paper contributes to extant research on blockchain infrastructures in the following ways: First, 
it identifies and conceptualises a new mode of organising mediated by blockchain infrastructures 
where forking is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the realisation of new organising 
objectives and practices. Second, it proposes, substantiates, and empirically identifies the 
concept of forking to show how, and when, code development practices combine into a pattern of 
self-organising. In so doing, it provides a vocabulary for describing the different patterns of self-
organisation in blockchain infrastructures; variation, adaptation, bifurcation, and speciation.  
Blockchain infrastructures are, in many ways, the harbingers of infrastructures to come: 
distributed control, fluid technological capabilities, and openness to manipulation by a large and 
heterogeneous community are increasingly commonplace (Beck et al. 2018; Hanseth and 
Lyytinen 2010). This is partly because of technological advances, and also because community 
members (whether users or miners) themselves hold the skills, and tools, to support—and 
destroy—a digital infrastructure through code forking and adoption (Kallinikos et al. 2013; Rullani 
and Haefliger 2013). Indeed, the fact that code-level changes and associated objectives are often 
hotly contested, both this paper and previous research in OS communities show that forking is 
sometimes unavoidable. Understanding its role in the design and organisation of a digital 
infrastructure like the blockchain therefore holds value as such infrastructures become more 
common—and indeed vital to modern societies. We therefore encourage future examination of 
the role of code, and code forking in particular, in organisational change and self-organising. We 
further encourage research into patterns of self-organising other than forking, whether in 
blockchain infrastructures or next generation distributed digital infrastructures. Lastly, we 
encourage empirical studies that improve our understanding of generative mirroring. 
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